MEHRA.DOC

03/27/00 8:36 PM

EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT AND THE MYTH OF
INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS
SALIL K. MEHRA*
I. INTRODUCTION
The extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws has recently
jumped from the pages of textbooks and law journals into the
headlines. Commentators, policymakers, journalists and (perhaps
most importantly) businesspeople have struggled with the question of
whether conduct that physically occurs overseas falls within the ambit
of U.S. law enforcement. Perhaps this dilemma is inevitable, as trade
becomes increasingly international and sovereigns with different
levels of regulation meet in the marketplace.1
Antitrust law has not been the only branch of U.S. law
confronting the issue of extraterritorial application. American courts
have also considered similar issues in the field of financial market
regulation, particularly in the context of foreign nations’ laws and
policies that directly conflict with the enforcement of U.S. laws
against securities fraud.2 In doing so, courts have increasingly
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1. See Philip Wood, Financial Conglomerates and Conflicts of Interest, in CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST IN THE CHANGING WORLD 74 (R. Goode ed., 1986). “Securities regulation is local.
But securities trading is international. It is inevitable, therefore, that there may be collision
between high and low-regulated states.” Id.
2. The Second Circuit has played a prominent role in this post-war development. See
Roberta S. Karmel, The Second Circuit’s Role in Expanding the SEC’s Jurisdiction Abroad, 65
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 743, 749-50 (1991) (providing an overview of the evolution of
extraterritorial application of U.S. securities law from the perspective of an enforcer focusing on
Second Circuit case law); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous
Extraterritoriality of American Securities Law, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207, 216-17 (1996)
(discussing Second Circuit case law). The Second Circuit has also taken the lead in addressing
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discounted international comity as a reason to inhibit the
extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. financial market regulation.3
The changes of the 1990s have increased the likelihood that U.S.
laws regulating markets—such as securities laws that regulate
financial and product markets—will become international in scope.
Several developments have forced American antitrust law to address
overseas conduct. First, actors in markets for goods and services no
longer limit their activities within national borders to the extent that
they once did.4 Second, several legal cases, including the U.S.
Supreme Court’s 1993 opinion in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
5
California, have raised questions about the role of U.S. courts in
construing the scope of American antitrust law. Finally, the U.S.
executive branch, as well as its counterparts abroad, has identified
antitrust law as both a trade issue and a possible political concern.6
The Boeing-European Commission case presents a stark
example of potential conflict. This battle over European approval—
for a merger of two American companies with no European
production facilities7—rapidly came to involve high-level officials, up
to and including the U.S. President.8 The Boeing battle also
the role of comity in the context of foreign laws that inhibit U.S. financial market regulation.
See Howard S. Erbstein, Palm Trees Hide More Than Sunshine: The Extraterritoriality of
Securities Laws in Haven Jurisdictions, 13 DICK. J. INT’L L. 441, 470 n.194 (1995).
3. Admittedly, not all commentators believe that extraterritorial enforcement of U.S.
securities law is beneficial. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 2, at 216 (emphasizing that
extraterritorial application of securities law creates a bias towards over-regulation and
restriction of investors’ freedom to choose the best legal regime for their capital). But it is well
established that U.S. financial market regulation extends beyond U.S. territory. See Erbstein,
supra note 2, at 466-67. “[W]hen transactions initiated by agents abroad involve trading on
United States exchanges, the pricing and hedging functions of the domestic markets are directly
implicated, just as they would be by an entirely domestic transaction.” Id. (quoting Tamari v.
Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 730 F.2d 110, 118 (7th Cir. 1984)).
4. See Jeffery E. Garten, Dangers Lurk in the Global Economy, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17,
1997, at A22 (noting that “[t]he share of U.S. GDP attributable to international trade has
doubled in this decade, to 23%, and today, exports are responsible for 30% of our economic
growth”).
5. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
6. See Crash Landing: Boeing’s Ordeal in EU Was Mostly of its Own Making, WALL ST. J.
EUR., July 28, 1997, at 1 (reporting that President Clinton, French President Jacques Chirac,
and other European leaders became involved in an effort to resolve the Boeing-EU standoff
without a trade war).
7. See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Clinton Hints U.S. May Retaliate if EU Tries to Block Boeing-McDonnell Deal,
WALL ST. J., July 18, 1997, at A2 (quoting President Clinton’s comment that “it would be
unfortunate if we had a trade stand-off with [the EU]”); Air Freight: Threat of a Trade War Over
Boeing Reflects Antitrust Limitations, WALL ST. J. EUR., July 18, 1997, at 1 (describing President
Clinton as joining the “battle” over the merger and quoting a U.S. official that “a complaint to
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illustrates that nations whose courts and legislatures have in the past
decried U.S. extraterritorial antitrust enforcement as an infringement
on their sovereignty, now will not hesitate to enforce their own laws
extraterritorially.
Times and markets have changed. Already, in a parallel reaction
to these changes, when U.S. courts are faced with foreign laws
inhibiting the extraterritorial reach of U.S. financial market
regulation, the courts demonstrate limited comity concerns or reject
comity concerns altogether. The concerns that have driven this shift
in the field of securities regulation apply to the antitrust context as
well.9
In Hartford Fire, the Supreme Court ruled that even assuming
that a U.S. court could ever withhold the exercise of its jurisdiction
based on comity, the only relevant inquiry would be whether a
defendant was compelled by foreign law to violate U.S. law. Without
definitively concluding that comity was necessarily a judicial concern,
the Court narrowed the comity inquiry to the sole question of
whether U.S. law prohibits what foreign law requires.
Since Hartford Fire, commentators on comity’s relevance to
extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. antitrust law have largely focused
on comity’s implications in international cooperation and effective
regulation, given the Court’s limited concern for comity in the context
of the Sherman Act.10 Additionally, some critics of Hartford Fire
the World Trade Organization and retaliatory tariffs” were possible options if no resolution to
the standoff was found).
9. Compare SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 117-18. (S.D.N.Y 1981)
(expressing concern that “secret foreign financial institutions . . . have allowed Americans and
others to avoid the law and regulations concerning securities and exchanges”) with United
States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1997) (refusing to dismiss criminal
antitrust charges on comity grounds since to do so “would create perverse incentives for those
who would use nefarious means to influence markets in the United States, rewarding them for
erecting as many territorial firewalls as possible between cause and effect”).
10. Critics of Hartford Fire have focused on its possible negative impact on U.S. foreign
policy. See, e.g., James P. Rhatican, Hartford Fire v. California: A Mixed Blessing for Insurance
Defendants, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 905, 955 (1995) (arguing that abandonment of comity could
make America a “commercial pariah in the arena of world trade”); Robert C. Reuland,
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Comity, and the Extraterritorial Reach of United States Antitrust Law, 29
TEX. INT’L L.J. 159, 208 (1994) (stating that the Hartford Fire Court “sows the seeds for
renewed conflict in our international relations over inconsiderate extraterritorial application of
our laws”); Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality in an Age of Globalization: The Hartford Fire
Case, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 283, 317-23 (advocating use of comity analysis, especially in “private
treble-damage actions where . . . foreign policy considerations play no role in the private
decision to bring the action”). But see John H. Chung, Comment, The International Antitrust
Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994 and the Maelstrom Surrounding the Extraterritorial
Application of the Sherman Act, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 371, 373, 399 (1996) (describing Hartford Fire
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broadly argue for the resurrection of the more multifaceted comity
inquiry the Ninth Circuit previously employed.11 These critics
contend that future U.S. courts will not be able to take appropriate
account of foreign national interests, rendering American judges
powerless to avert what the commentators perceive as unwarranted
extensions of U.S. law that will irritate our trading partners.
However, commentators have not focused on the degree to
which the rejection of comity accords with the Erie doctrine12 and with
U.S. case law in the field of financial market regulation. Conversely,
a reanimation of comity would pose dangers for established notions
of extraterritorial enforcement of American law in the financial
market context and would confer a burden on U.S. courts that is
probably misplaced. Nor has the focus been placed on the reduced
benefits of comity, given the strong possibility that an international
consensus regarding antitrust enforcement does not exist. Hartford
Fire and some of its progeny appear to reflect the understanding that
the case for comity depends largely upon the degree of consensus
between different nations’ laws and enforcement policies.13
Because there was no direct conflict of American and foreign
laws on the facts of Hartford Fire, in order to rule that comity did not
foreclose jurisdiction, the Court did not have to decide whether the
limited inquiry that it described was in fact necessary. As a result, the
question of whether comity is even applicable in the Sherman Act14
as having helped create “jurisdictional chaos” and calling for a “non-judicial branch . . . to
harmonize jurisdictional rules”). Those commentators not critical of Hartford Fire similarly
base their support on positive predictions of that decision’s impact on U.S. trade relations. See,
e.g., William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for
Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 101, 157 (1998) (arguing that judges should dismiss
comity concerns in part “because a more permissive attitude towards anti-competitive conduct
will allow domestic producers to increase their profits at the expense of foreign consumers to an
extent sufficient to offset the loss to domestic consumers from the same anti-competitive
conduct,” and thus states have a systematic bias towards under-enforcement); Varun Gupta,
Note, After Hartford Fire: Antitrust and Comity, 84 GEO. L.J. 2287, 2288, 2316-18 (1996)
(arguing that comity is unnecessary because other factors, including the requirement of personal
jurisdiction and international economic integration, protect foreign defendants and thus
mitigate conflict with other nations).
11. See, e.g., Reuland, supra note 10, at 208-09 (arguing that the Hartford Fire majority’s
“discussion of comity is of questionable authority” and that comity should continue to be
applied to reduce conflict between different nations’ laws because “comity is desirable in every
facet of international relations”); Dam, supra note 10, at 319 (“one may still find [a multifactor
test] preferable to the supposed certainty of absolutism of Hartford Fire”).
12. See Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
13. See infra notes 124-131 and accompanying text (discussing Nippon Paper Industries, 109
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997)).
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
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context is still an open one. Numerous commentators have concluded
that the Court misfired and should have given greater weight to
comity concerns.15 While at least one commentator has endorsed the
view that the Hartford Fire Court properly narrowed the comity
inquiry,16 this Article concludes that given U.S. case law on financial
market regulation, the lack of a clear international consensus
regarding antitrust enforcement, and the Erie doctrine’s requirement
that U.S. law have an articulable, positive source, in the appropriate
case, the Supreme Court should reject the comity inquiry entirely.
Several considerations drive this conclusion. First, the increased
ease with which comity can be exploited by wrongdoers in a global
marketplace17 counsels for a definitive repudiation of the judicial
comity inquiry applied prior to Hartford Fire. Interestingly, in its line
of cases addressing comity in financial market regulation, the Second
Circuit did not apply different standards to private parties than to the
government, as some commentators have advocated in the antitrust
context.18 Second, the contradictions in case law since Hartford Fire
demonstrate the difficulties with judicial action in this area and
illustrate the need for clear guidance from the Court. For instance, in
upholding the extraterritorial enforcement of criminal antitrust law,
the First Circuit supplied a rationale strikingly similar to that which
led the Second Circuit to water down, if not altogether discard,
comity in the field of financial market regulation.19 Third, the Boeing
incident shows that extraterritorial enforcement of antitrust law
creates intensely political disputes among nations and that
international consensus is imperfect, if not illusory.20 In rejecting
comity in the context of financial market regulation, the Second
Circuit discounted the notion of international consensus to which it

15. See discussion supra note 10.
16. See Dodge, supra note 10, at 104.
17. See Nippon Paper Indus., 109 F.3d at 8 (noting that “[w]e live in an age of international
commerce, where decisions reached in one corner of the world can reverberate around the
globe in less time than it takes to tell the tale” and that violators may exploit “territorial
firewalls”). This concern led the Second Circuit to curtail comity when confronting foreign laws
that inhibit U.S. financial market regulation. See discussion infra Part II.
18. See, e.g., Dam, supra note 10, at 320 (stating that private plaintiffs fail to take into
account the “foreign and economic policy considerations” that government plaintiffs weigh
when deciding to bring an action); Gupta, supra note 10, at 2287 n.2 (addressing “considerations
of comity in the context of private antitrust litigation only”).
19. See infra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing Nippon Paper Industries).
20. See discussion infra Part IV.
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had previously pointed in support of comity.21 Finally, judge-made
limits on antitrust law enforcement that are justified by reference to
customary international law22 may conflict with the lack of a general
consensus on the validity of customary international law.
Part II of this Article discusses the ways in which U.S. case law,
and particularly that of the Second Circuit, is evolving towards a
rejection of comity analysis when addressing foreign laws that inhibit
American securities regulation. Part III outlines the approach to
extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction adopted in Hartford Fire, as well
as questions posed by subsequent circuit court interpretations of
comity in United States v. Nippon Paper Industries Co.23 and Metro
24
Industries, Inc. v. Sammi Corp. Part IV examines the BoeingMcDonnell Douglas struggle with the European Commission, which
suggests that the prior assumptions justifying a territorial approach
are questionable. Part V briefly assesses the implications of the post25
Erie debate regarding the validity of customary international law for
the suitability of the judicial inquiry into comity in the antitrust field.
A short conclusion follows in Part VI.
II. THE RISE AND DECLINE OF COMITY CONCERNS:
CONFLICT BETWEEN FOREIGN LAWS AND THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL ENFORCEMENT OF U.S. FINANCIAL
MARKET REGULATIONS
Since the Great Depression, U.S. financial markets have been
regulated through the enforcement of laws prohibiting fraud and the
manipulation or misuse of inside information in the purchase and sale
of securities.26 To enforce these laws both criminally and civilly, the
21. See infra notes 48-60 and accompanying text (discussing Trade Dev. Bank and Banca
Della Svizzera Italiana).
22. Customary international law has been defined as the actual practice of States supported
by their belief that such practice is legally mandated. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 816
(6th ed. 1990) (defining international law as a “[b]ody of consensual principles which have
evolved from customs and practices civilized nations utilize in regulating their relationships . . .
hav[ing] great moral force”); Charles A. Allen, Civilian Starvation and Relief During Armed
Conflict: the Modern Humanitarian Law, 19 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 77-78 (1989) (defining
customary international law as general and consistent state practice supported by opinio juris).
23. 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997).
24. 82 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 1996).
25. See Gupta, supra note 10, at 2288 (arguing, in part, that political circumstances have
made possible “[e]conomically reasoned antitrust enforcement that is not hindered by political
considerations”).
26. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ll (1998). State regulation of securities trading dates to considerably
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government and private plaintiffs often depend on the discovery
process to develop their cases; this dependence is echoed in cases
involving the extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. securities laws.27
Over the past several decades, the Second Circuit has tried to
reconcile the presence of foreign laws, ostensibly aimed at privacy,
that penalize banks and bank employees for disclosing customer
information and that tend to insulate the bank customers’ overseas
activities from discovery. As a result, the regulation of U.S. financial
markets sometimes presents a direct conflict between American law
mandating production of information in discovery and foreign laws
penalizing its disclosure.28 This conflict places banks, often nonparties
to the underlying litigation, in a catch-22 situation: U.S. courts must
determine whether they should alleviate this conflict or even address
it at all. This discussion will focus on the jurisprudence developed by
the Second Circuit in response to this conflict. 29
The Second Circuit initially followed the guidance of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Societé Internationale Pour
30
Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers. In that
case, the Supreme Court considered whether the district court had
earlier. See, e.g., Thomas L. Hazen, Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling?—
Derivative Securities and Financial Futures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital Markets,
86 NW. U. L. REV. 987, 1014-15 (1992) (describing the 1829 New York Stock Jobbing Act).
27. See, e.g., Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960) (subpoena duces tecum sought
that would require Canadian banks to produce records relevant to determine the fairness of a
proposed settlement in a stockholders’ derivative action); Trade Dev. Bank v. Continental Ins.
Co., 469 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1972) (American insurance company sought discovery of records of
Swiss bank claimant); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); cf.
United States v. Time Warner, Inc., No. MISC.A. 94-338(HHG), 1997 WL 118413, at *6
(D.D.C. Jan. 22, 1997) (action to enforce civil investigative demand seeking documents in
antitrust investigation regarding overseas actions of demandees).
28. The American system of discovery has been described as uniquely setting the United
States apart from other nations. See, e.g., GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS, 261-84
(1989) (“the scope of discovery in most foreign countries is generally much more limited than
pretrial U.S. discovery”); Daiske Yoshida, The Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to
Communications with Foreign Legal Professionals, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 210 (1997)
(“wide-open discovery in the American style simply does not exist in other countries”). This
system provides for discovery production not just by parties to litigation, but by others who may
have relevant information. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 31(a)(1) (stating that “[a] party may take
the deposition of any person without leave of court” subject to a few requirements).
29. In the context of securities regulation, the Second Circuit has been called the “Mother
Court,” since its jurisdiction encompasses New York. The Second Circuit has developed a
substantial and persuasive body of securities law. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Karmel, supra note 2, at 743 (“The
Second Circuit has had . . . a profound impact on securities law.”).
30. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
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properly dismissed the action of a Swiss company, which was seeking
recovery of assets seized by the United States during World War II.
Because a Swiss bank had refused to disclose bank records in
accordance with Swiss penal laws, the district court dismissed the
action.31 The U.S. government claimed the documents were crucial to
demonstrate that the Swiss bank and the corporate plaintiff were the
same entity and to show that the bank, the plaintiff, and a German
company had conspired to evade seizure under U.S. law during the
war.32 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court concluded that the district
court properly dismissed the action because, in light of the bank’s
non-production, allowing the corporate plaintiff to argue that it did
not have “control” of the documents would “invite efforts to place
ownership of American assets in persons or firms whose sovereign
assures secrecy of records.”33 The Court recognized that the plaintiff
was “in a most advantageous position to plead with its own sovereign
for relaxation of penal laws or for adoption of plans” that could
“achieve a significant measure of compliance with the production
order.”34
Despite Societé Internationale’s rather skeptical view of foreign
bank secrecy law, for some time thereafter, the Second Circuit treated
such laws with considerable deference.35 Indeed, the Second Circuit
has concluded that because the benefits of punishing securities law
violators could not outweigh comity interests, the court would not
issue an order that would even risk compelling a violation of another
nation’s law.36 In Ings v. Ferguson, the Second Circuit addressed
whether, pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum served in an underlying
shareholders’ derivative action to which the bank was not a party, a
Canadian bank with branches in the United States could be required
31. See id. at 200.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 205. The Court did, however, rule that the action should not have been dismissed
with prejudice. See id. at 212-13.
34. Id. at 205.
35. This tension was recognized explicitly in SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92
F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Despite the teachings of Societé, three early Second Circuit cases appeared to view
foreign law prohibitions as an absolute bar to ordering inspection or production of
documents. . . . All . . . of the . . . cases dealt with a nonparty witness and that factor
may have been the one distinguishing these cases from Societé. . . . In any event the
Second Circuit has clearly moved to a more flexible position.
Id. at 114-15 (citations omitted).
36. See Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 1960) (deferring without concluding
that an actual conflict of laws existed, and resting its conclusion on the fact that a potential
“conflict of theories” existed).
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to produce records physically located in Canada.37 The Ings court did
not decide whether disclosure would in fact violate Canadian law,
since it concluded that enough of a “conflict of theories exist[ed]” to
“point[] to the desirability of having the impact of Canadian statutes
passed upon by Canadian courts.”38 The Second Circuit refused to
order compliance with the subpoena, since “[u]pon fundamental
principles of international comity, our courts dedicated to the
enforcement of our laws should not take such action as may cause a
violation of the laws of a friendly neighbor or, at the least, an
unnecessary circumvention of its procedures.”39 The court observed
that as evidenced by the fact that nations have long allowed the use of
letters rogatory40 to obtain documents in foreign countries,
“international comity exists” “amongst civilized nations.”41
Interestingly, there was no discussion of balancing or weighing; the
mere possibility of conflict trumped any importance that the soughtafter discovery might have had in the plaintiff’s case.
The Ings decision not to order compliance, despite the absence
of a clear conflict between American and foreign law, was particularly
influenced by the Second Circuit’s holding the year before in a case
arising out of a tax evasion action, First National City Bank v. Internal
42
Revenue Service, in which an American bank challenged a subpoena
to produce a Panamanian customer’s records. The bank argued that
the records were located at its Panama branch, and that to produce
them would violate Panamanian law.43 The Second Circuit stated that
“[i]f such were the fact we should agree that the production of the
Panama records should not be ordered.”44 However, because the
court was unconvinced that production would in fact violate
Panamanian law, it remanded the case for further proceedings
addressing the question.
37. See id. at 150-51.
38. Id. at 151.
39. Id. at 152.
40. A letter rogatory is defined as “[a] request by one court of another court in an
independent jurisdiction that a witness be examined upon interrogatories sent with the request.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 905 (6th ed. 1990).
41. Ings, 282 F.2d at 151.
42. 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959).
43. See id. at 619.
44. Id. at 619. The Ings court quoted this language. See Ings, 282 F.2d at 152. Somewhat
discordantly, the First National City Bank court also noted, in dicta, that “[i]f the Bank cannot,
as it were, serve two masters and comply with the lawful requirements both of the United States
and Panama, perhaps it should surrender to one sovereign or the other the privileges received
therefrom.” First Nat’l City Bank, 271 F.2d at 620.
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Shortly after Ings and First National City Bank, the Second
Circuit in Application of the Chase Manhattan Bank45 affirmed a
district court’s order vacating a similar subpoena in light of evidence
that disclosure would conflict with Panamanian law; the appellate
court relied on Ings, which had been decided in the interim.46 The
court ruled that it could not order an action that would violate a
foreign law—even where the penalty for such a violation was at most
a $100 fine.47 In essence, the court refused to weigh the degree of the
violation against the plaintiff’s interest in discovery, even where
prosecution of American justice would be impaired.
After these cases, the Second Circuit “moved to a more flexible
position” in the 1960s.48 To weigh the benefits of comity against the
detriment of increasing the odds that violators will escape without
penalty, the appellate court adopted a balancing test to address
foreign laws that inhibit disclosure of materials in the context of
securities fraud.49 The test, based largely on section 40 of the
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations which had been
published in 1965 after the First National City Bank, Ings, and Chase
Manhattan Bank decisions, balanced the vital national interests of
each of the countries involved (as well as any hardship considerations
for the parties to the instant action) and also considered whether the
affected party had shown good faith.50 In Trade Development Bank v.
51
Continental Insurance Co., a claim involving securities fraud, the
Second Circuit reviewed the trial judge’s conclusion that Swiss law
prohibited disclosure of customers’ identities to the plaintiff and that
“as a matter of comity he would therefore not require the Bank to
identify the customers whose accounts were involved, particularly
since in his view the identity was not essential to the issue on trial.”52
The appellate court concluded that the trial court was “entitled in its
discretion, after balancing the interests involved, to defer to Swiss

45. 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962).
46. See id at 613.
47. See id. at 612; see also United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 902 (2d Cir.
1968) (discussing Application of The Chase Manhattan Bank).
48. SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
49. See First Nat’l City Bank, 396 F.2d at 901-03.
50. See Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. at 118-19. The test included several “less
important” factors, including the place of performance, the nationality of the resisting party and
the extent to which enforcement can be expected to achieve compliance. Id. at 119.
51. 469 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1972).
52. Id. at 40.
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law.”53
Notably, the circuit panel decided that “the relative
unimportance” of the information sought was “entitled to be
considered” alongside the other Restatement factors.54
As applied, this balancing test has gradually tilted the scales
against deference to comity in a securities regulation claim. In
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Banca Della Svizzera
55
Italiana, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York applied the Restatement-based balancing test to a
litigant’s challenge to discovery in a securities law action.56 In
ordering a foreign bank to comply with discovery, the court
recognized that “the strength of the United States interest in
enforcing its securities laws to ensure the integrity of its financial
markets cannot seriously be doubted.”57 The Banca Della Svizzera
Italiana court also acknowledged that, since the earlier Second Circuit
cases, Congress had determined that this enforcement “interest [was]
being continually thwarted by the use of foreign bank accounts.”58
The court concluded that no hardship considerations should outweigh
U.S. interests; although the bank may “be subject to fines and its
officers to imprisonment,” it may be able to avoid prosecution under
the flexible application of Swiss law.59 This rationale marked a
considerable shift from the Circuit’s earlier refusal to force bank
officials to risk a $100 Panamanian fine in Chase Manhattan Bank.60
The Second Circuit and the district courts below continue to
apply the Banca Della Svizzera Italiana balancing test to bank secrecy
laws both inside and outside the securities law context.61 In contrast
53. Id. at 41.
54. Id.
55. 92 F.R.D. at 111.
56. See id. at 116-17.
57. Id. at 117. The court also noted that “[t]he Swiss government . . . expressed no
opposition,” although the “incumbent Swiss Federal Attorney General” said that “a foreign
court could not change the rule that disclosure required the consent of the one who imparted
the secret and that [the bank] might thus be subject to prosecution.” Id. at 117-18.
58. Id at 117. The court quoted Congress’ finding that “secret foreign financial
institutions . . . have allowed Americans and others to avoid the law and regulations concerning
securities and exchanges. . . . The debilitating effects of the use of these secret institutions on
Americans and the American economy are vast.” Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 91-975, at 12
(1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4394, 4397).
59. Id. at 118.
60. 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1033-36 (2d Cir. 1985) (compelling
production of Cayman bank documents in underlying criminal fraud action); Compagnie
Francaise d’Assurance v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D. 16, 29-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(compelling production in underlying contract action); Alfadda v. Fenn, 149 F.R.D. 28, 33-35
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to earlier case law that viewed a direct conflict between American
and foreign law as sufficient to justify U.S. courts’ deference to the
foreign law on comity grounds, the Second Circuit now consistently
uses this more flexible approach, allowing enforcement of U.S. laws
even if they directly conflict with foreign law. Indeed, in the
securities regulation context, the Second Circuit may have adopted a
test that prohibits deference to foreign laws that halt U.S. discovery.62
This rejection of comity may well spread farther than the Second
Circuit; although many of the nations that have adopted bank secrecy
laws view them as critical to the health of their financial industries,63 it
is difficult to imagine any American court concluding that the
interests of these foreign jurisdictions should outweigh the U.S.
interest in the integrity of its own financial markets. Moreover, to the
extent that the Banca Della Svizzera Italiana court almost entirely
discounted the potential civil and criminal liability of the subpoenaed
bank under Swiss law, it is unclear exactly what level of hardship a
litigant must face in order to justify deference for the sake of comity.64
This increasingly hard-edged view of foreign laws that inhibit
discovery in American litigation contrasts sharply with the
solicitousness of comity concerns and the emphasis on international
consensus previously voiced by the Second Circuit in Ings v.
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (denying entry of protective order in underlying securities action prohibiting
discovery of information of which Swiss bank secrecy laws allegedly forbade disclosure).
62. See Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 1960) (deferring on comity grounds
where a potential “conflict of theories”—not even of laws—existed); Chase Manhattan Bank,
297 F.2d at 619 (deferring where defendant would face a foreign $100 fine). But cf. Banca Della
Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. at 118 (refusing to defer and noting that even if the defendant were
whipsawed by U.S. and foreign law, that “would be a result of [its own] bad faith”).
63. See, e.g., Erbstein, supra note 2, at 449 n.37-38, and accompanying text (describing the
Bahamas’ legislative bolstering of bank secrecy, a “factor essential in the attraction of financial
business,” whose “strengthening . . . would bolster” “the interests of the Bahamas”); C. Todd
Jones, Compulsion Over Comity: The United States’ Assault on Foreign Bank Secrecy, 12 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 454, 455 (1992) (describing the prevention of capital flight as one reason for
bank secrecy laws in developing and unstable countries); Jennifer A. Mencken, Note,
Supervising Secrecy: Preventing Abuses Within Bank Secrecy and Financial Privacy Systems, 21
B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 461, 467-71 (1998) (describing Swiss bank secrecy laws as
codification of Swiss bankers’ customs aimed at stabilizing banking system in the face of prewar
and World War II-era instability in Germany). But see DENNIS CAMPBELL, INTERNATIONAL
BANK SECRECY 727-28 (1992) (describing EU process of scaling back the secrecy protections
available in some member states in order to safeguard integrity of financial markets); That
Infernal Washing Machine, THE ECONOMIST, July 26, 1997, at 20 (describing the Seychellais
withdrawal, under international pressure, of laws offering a high degree of privacy to large bank
depositors).
64. The Banca Della Svizzera Italiana court noted in passing that the insider trading
transactions alleged in the underlying case would have profited the bank, and thus the bank’s
dilemma “would be a result of [its own] bad faith.” 92 F.R.D. at 118.
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65
One explanation for this shift, as explicitly noted in
Ferguson.
Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, is that in the interim, U.S. courts and
lawmakers have recognized that an international “consensus” was
chimerical at best, and that U.S. courts could not defer to foreign law
and expect justice to work itself out.66
This realization was
particularly persuasive in the context of financial market regulation.
Notably the Second Circuit cases did not explicitly contemplate if the
test would differ depending on whether the party seeking
extraterritorial enforcement was the government or a private party—
a fact perhaps most salient in the antitrust context. Given the U.S.
interests at stake in this vitally important field, U.S. courts could no
longer automatically defer on the grounds of comity.

III. JUDICIAL COMITY CONCERNS IN ANTITRUST
American courts may be on their way to coming full circle
regarding comity. Ninety years ago, courts undertook little or no
comity analysis in antitrust litigation because they considered the
Sherman Act wholly inapplicable to acts committed outside the
United States.67 In 1993, the Supreme Court applied comity analysis
in Hartford Fire,68 but explicitly stated that based on the facts of the
case, such analysis might not be applicable.69 The Court ruled that
comity’s sole function was to prevent a defendant being placed in a
“catch-22” between American and foreign law.70 But since 1993, U.S.
courts have attempted much more involved comity analysis, requiring
the balancing of domestic and foreign concerns. The willingness of
U.S. courts to defer to foreign law on comity grounds, even absent a
direct conflict between American and foreign laws, echoes the Second
Circuit’s earlier approach in Ings v. Ferguson.71
A. The Road to Hartford Fire
In its 1909 decision in American Banana v. United Fruit Co.,72 the
Supreme Court first considered, and ultimately rejected, the Sherman
65. 282 F.2d 149 (2d. Cir. 1960); see also supra note 36 and accompanying text.
66. 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
67. See American Banana v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1909).
68. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
69. See id. at 798.
70. See id. at 799.
71. 282 F.2d 149 at 152 (2d Cir. 1960) (deferring on comity grounds in the face of a possible
conflict).
72. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
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Act’s jurisdiction over foreign trade and commerce.73 Writing for the
Court, Justice Holmes noted that “the acts causing the damage were
done . . . outside the jurisdiction of the United States” and the
lawfulness of an act “must be determined wholly by the law of the
country where the act is done.”74 United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.75
broadened this narrow view of the Sherman Act’s reach.76 In that
case, the Court considered the actions abroad of “parties to a
successful plan to destroy competition and to control and monopolize
the purchase, importation and sale of sisal,”77 an organic fiber that
was a key ingredient in more than eighty percent of the binder twine
used for harvesting grain crops.78 The Sisal Sales Court distinguished
American Banana by noting that in that case, the Costa Rican
government seized the plaintiff’s plantation. The Court declared that
a state seizure “is not a thing that can be complained of elsewhere in
the courts.”79 By contrast, the Court described the conduct in Sisal
Sales as “a contract, combination and conspiracy” whose
“fundamental object was control of both importation and sale of sisal
[within the United States] and complete monopoly of both internal
and external trade and commerce therein.”80
In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (the “Alcoa”
case),81 the Second Circuit, sitting as a court of last resort,82 explicitly
abandoned the principle that the law of the country where an act is
The Court
performed must determine the act’s lawfulness.83
considered whether the Sherman Act punished agreements made
overseas that “would clearly have been unlawful, had they been made
within the United States.”84 In an opinion by Judge Learned Hand,
the Court remarked that it should “not . . . read general words, such
as those in [the Sherman] Act, without regard to the limitations
customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers;
limitations which generally correspond to those fixed by the ‘Conflict
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See generally id.
Id. at 355-56.
272 U.S. 268 (1927).
See id. at 272.
Id. at 274.
See id. at 272.
Id. at 276.
Id.
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
See id. at 421.
See id. at 443.
Id. at 444.
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of Laws.’”85 In concluding that the Sherman Act could be enforced
against the agreements at issue, Judge Hand set forth an “effects”
test, under which the Sherman Act prohibited acts occurring outside
the United States “if they were intended to affect imports and did
affect them.”86 The Supreme Court later adopted this view.87
Subsequently, in its influential Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank
88
of America opinion, the Ninth Circuit expressed concerns that the
Alcoa effects test failed to account adequately for other nations’
interests.89 The Timberlane Court considered whether the Sherman
Act could be applied properly to activity that had taken place in
Honduras.90 Guided by section 40 of the Restatement (Second) of
91
Foreign Relations Law, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized
international comity concerns.92 Although the Court concluded that
the acts fell within the jurisdiction of U.S. antitrust law, it did so by
applying a set of factors, known as the “jurisdictional rule of reason”
which included:93
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or
allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of
business of corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either
state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative
significance of effects on the United States as compared with those
elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or
affect American commerce, the forseeability of such effect, and the
relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the
94
United States as compared with conduct abroad.

85. Id. at 443.
86. Id. at 444.
87. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704
(1962) (holding that “[a] conspiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or foreign
commerce of the United States is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because part of
the conduct complained of occurs in foreign countries”).
88. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
89. See id. at 609.
90. See id. at 604.
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40
(1965).
92. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613-14, 614 n.31 (inquiring “whether the interests of, and
links to, the United States—including the magnitude of the effect on American foreign
commerce—are sufficiently strong, vis-a-vis those of other nations, to justify an assertion of
extraterritorial authority”).
93. Id. at 613-614.
94. Id. at 614.

MEHRA.DOC

206

03/27/00 8:36 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 10:191

B. Hartford Fire: Comity’s End?
The schism between the approaches in Alcoa and Timberlane
gradually diminished. By the time the Supreme Court decided
Hartford Fire, it was “well established . . . that the Sherman Act
applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact
produce some substantial effect in the United States.”95 In Hartford
Fire, the district court dismissed, on comity grounds, the antitrust
claims of several states and private parties against foreign insurance
brokers.96 The plaintiffs alleged that “certain London reinsurers . . .
conspired to coerce primary insurers in the United States to offer”97
commercial general liability coverage only on specified terms, and to
boycott those insurers who did not conform.98 Applying the
Timberlane jurisdictional rule of reason, the Ninth Circuit reversed,
and “concluded that . . . the principle of international comity was no
bar to exercising Sherman Act jurisdiction.”99
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, but
undertook a strikingly different inquiry. Stating that it “need not
decide” the question of “whether a court with Sherman Act
jurisdiction should ever decline to exercise such jurisdiction on
grounds of international comity,” the Court concluded that
“international comity would not counsel against exercising
jurisdiction in the circumstances” at issue.100 According to the Court,
“[t]he only substantial question in [the] litigation [was] whether ‘there
[was] in fact a true conflict between domestic and foreign law.’”101
Citing to section 403, comment e of the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, the Court stated that “[n]o
conflict exists . . . ‘where a person subject to regulation by two states
can comply with the laws of both.’”102 Because the defendants did
“not argue that British law require[d] them to act in some fashion
prohibited by the law of the United States or claim that their
compliance with the laws of both countries [was] otherwise
95. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993).
96. See id. at 765.
97. Id. at 795.
98. See id. at 788, 795.
99. Id. at 779.
100. Id. at 798.
101. Id. (quoting Societé Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct. for
Southern Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)).
102. Id. at 799 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 403, cmt. e (1987)).
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impossible,” the Court saw “no conflict with British law.”103
Consequently, it saw no reason not to apply the Sherman Act to the
British defendants.104 In the Court’s view, no additional inquiry was
required.105
C. Hartford Fire’s Progeny
Although Hartford Fire set forth what the Supreme Court
believed would be the appropriate comity inquiry106—assuming that
such an inquiry could ever be appropriately undertaken—its guidance
has raised questions for both commentators and lower courts. Two
subsequent cases demonstrate the ambiguity remaining after Hartford
107
Fire. In Metro Industries, Inc. v. Sammi Corp. and United States v.
108
the Ninth and First Circuits,
Nippon Paper Industries Co.,
respectively, applied the Sherman Act with widely divergent readings
of the requirements of international comity.
In Metro Industries, an American importer and wholesaler of
kitchenware claimed that a Korean corporation’s use of a Korean
design registration system, which gave Korean producers of
holloware109 the exclusive right to export a particular holloware design
for three years, constituted a violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.110 According to Metro, Sammi used the registration system to
prevent Metro and other kitchenware importers from acquiring
Korean-made stainless steel steamers from Sammi’s Korean
competitors.111 Metro argued that such conduct constituted an
impermissible market division and was a per se violation. That is, if
Metro could prove Sammi’s alleged conduct, that conduct would
constitute a violation of the Sherman Act, and no application of the
rule-of-reason would be necessary.112
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. See id. But see id. at 820-821 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106. See id. at 799.
107. 82 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 1996).
108. 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997).
109. “Holloware” includes vessels such as bowls, cups or vases that have a significant depth
or volume, as opposed to flatware.
110. See Metro Indus., 82 F.3d at 841.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 843-44. As the court explains, “whether particular concerted activity violates
section 1 of the Sherman Act is determined through case-by-case application of the so-called
rule of reason—that is, ‘the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding
whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on
competition.’” Id. at 843. But certain types of restraints “have been held to be per se illegal . . .
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The Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Sammi. In an opinion by Judge Wiggins, the
court concluded that even if Metro could prove the alleged conduct,
“application of the per se rule is not appropriate where the conduct in
question occurred in another country.”113 The Ninth Circuit took an
extremely restrictive view of Hartford Fire’s implications for comity
considerations. Rather than interpret Hartford Fire as limiting
comity’s restrictions on antitrust law to situations where American
and foreign laws conflicted, the court concluded that Hartford Fire
“did not question the propriety of the jurisdictional rule of reason or
the seven comity factors set forth in Timberlane.”114
Although Metro Industries concluded that comity concerns alone
could not compel its finding of a lack of jurisdiction, the court also
applied a conventional antitrust rule-of-reason analysis, based in part
on its conclusion in relation to per se treatment.115 Under that
analysis, the court affirmed summary judgment for Sammi
Corporation, concluding that Metro Industries could not show the
required injury to competition.116
Whereas the Ninth Circuit had examined Hartford Fire in a civil
context, in Nippon Paper Industries, the First Circuit relied on
Hartford Fire to support a U.S. criminal antitrust prosecution, based
on acts committed abroad.117 The Nippon Paper Industries trial court
had dismissed the indictment against a Japanese corporation for
allegedly fixing fax paper prices with several other Japanese
manufacturers.118 The indictment alleged that in meetings in Japan,
the companies “agreed to increase prices for fax paper to be imported
in North America.”119 The district court stated that “there is a strong
presumption against extraterritorial application of federal statutes,

[because they] always or almost always tend to restrict competition.” Id. As the court noted, “a
market allocation agreement between competitors at the same market level is a classic per se
antitrust violation.” Id. at 844.
113. Id. at 844-45.
114. Id. at 847 n.5.
115. See id. at 844-45 (holding in the alternative that rule of reason was applicable because
the conduct at issue was not a “garden-variety horizontal division of a market.”).
116. See id. at 847.
117. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 2R1.1 cmt.
n.7 (1998) (setting forth penalties and noting that “[t]he [Sentencing] Commission believes that
the most effective method to deter individuals from committing [antitrust] crime[s] is through
imposing short prison sentences coupled with large fines”).
118. See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 944 F. Supp. 55, 58 (D. Mass. 1996).
119. Id.

MEHRA.DOC

1999]

03/27/00 8:36 PM

EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

209

absent a clear expression by Congress to the contrary.”120 While the
district court read Hartford Fire to clarify that “this presumption has
been overcome in the case of civil application of the federal antitrust
laws,” it concluded that “the line of cases permitting extraterritorial
reach in civil actions is not controlling.”121 As a result, the district
court focused on other cases that required different inquiries in
applying criminal rather than civil statutes extraterritorially.122 It
concluded that the Sherman Act’s statutory silence and a portion of
its legislative history123 indicated that it was proper to dismiss the
indictment. On appeal, however, the First Circuit disagreed with the
district court’s analysis and accordingly reversed the judgment.124
In his majority opinion for the First Circuit, Judge Bruce Selya
clarified the court’s opposition to the opinion below, writing that “in
both criminal and civil cases, the claim that [the Sherman Act] applies
extraterritorially is based on the same language in the same section of
the same statute,” and that “common sense suggests that courts
should interpret the same language in the same section of the same
statute uniformly, regardless of whether the impetus for
interpretation is criminal or civil.”125 Judge Selya read Hartford Fire
to “suggest[] that comity concerns would operate to defeat the
exercise of jurisdiction only in those few cases in which the law of the
foreign sovereign required a defendant to act in a manner
incompatible with the Sherman Act or in which full compliance with
both statutory schemes was impossible.”126 Since the acts alleged were
illegal in both Japan and the United States, there was no “founded
concern about [the defendant] being whipsawed between separate
sovereigns.”127 Judge Selya went on to acknowledge that

120. Id. at 65.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 66 (citing statement of Senator Sherman in 21 CONG. REC. 2461 (1890) that,
“[e]ither a foreigner or a native may escape ‘the criminal part of the law’ . . . by staying out of
our jurisdiction, as very many do, but if they have property here it is subject to civil process. . . .
[A foreigner] may combine or conspire to his heart’s content if none of his co-conspirators are
here or his property is not here.”).
124. See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 1 (1st Cir. 1997).
125. Id. at 4.
126. Id. at 8.
127. Id. But see id. at 10-11 (Lynch, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion, Judge Lynch
inquired into the degree to which the indictment was valid under customary international law,
which Judge Lynch had read as “articulat[ing] principles, derived from international law, for
determining when the United States may properly exercise regulatory . . . jurisdiction over
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[w]e live in an age of international commerce, where decisions
reached in one corner of the world can reverberate around the
globe in less time than it takes to tell the tale. . . . [A] ruling in [the
defendant’s] favor would create perverse incentives for those who
would use nefarious means to influence markets in the United
States, rewarding them for erecting as many territorial firewalls as
128
possible between cause and effect.

His concerns echo those that had previously prompted U.S. securities
regulators to reach extraterritorially and had caused the Banca Della
Svizzera Italiana district court to voice its dismay that the “integrity of
[American] financial markets” was “being continually thwarted by
the use of foreign bank accounts.”129
Judge Selya’s opinion recognized that technically, in Hartford
Fire, the Supreme Court did not accept the validity of comity
analysis.130 He described “[c]omity [a]s more an aspiration than a
fixed rule, more a matter of grace than a matter of obligation.”131
Moreover, Judge Selya’s concerns about the misuse of “territorial
firewalls” mirror those in Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, rejecting
comity concerns in the context of discovery for financial market
regulation—even where defendants were being whipsawed.132 The
Second Circuit’s decisions have shifted from the nearly automatic
withholding of jurisdiction if a defendant was whipsawed,133 to the
adoption of a comity balancing test,134 to a refusal to apply comity
activities or persons connected with another state.” Id. at 11. Notably, the Government of
Japan filed an amicus brief in favor of dismissing the indictment.
128. Id. at 8.
129. 92 F.R.D. 111, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (quoting Congress’ finding that “secret foreign
financial institutions . . . have allowed Americans and others to avoid the law and regulations
concerning securities and exchanges. . . . The debilitating effects of the use of these secret
institutions on Americans and the American economy are vast.”).
130. See Nippon Paper Indus., 109 F.3d at 8. The Supreme Court “suggested that comity
concerns would operate to defeat the exercise of jurisdiction only in those few cases in which the
law of the foreign sovereign required a defendant to act in a manner incompatible with the
Sherman Act or in which full compliance with both statutory schemes was impossible.” Id.
(emphasis added). See also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798. “Congress
expressed no view on the question whether a court with Sherman Act jurisdiction should ever
decline to exercise such jurisdiction on grounds of international comity. [And we] need not
decide that question here, however, for even assuming that in a proper case a court may decline
to exercise Sherman Act jurisdiction over foreign conduct, international comity would not
counsel against exercising jurisdiction in the circumstances alleged here.” Id. (emphasis added
and internal citations omitted); see also United States v. Time Warner, 1997-1 Trade Cas. ¶
71,702, 1997 WL 118413, *6 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 1997) (strongly repudiating application of comity).
131. Nippon Paper Indus., 109 F.3d at 8.
132. 92 F.R.D. at 117-118.
133. See First Nat’l City Bank v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959).
134. See Trade Dev. Bank v. Continental Ins., Co., 469 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1972).
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because of suspicion that it could be exploited by wrongdoers.135 In
the early Second Circuit cases, the Court relied on the idea that a
consensus among American and foreign regulators obviated the need
for U.S. courts to exercise their Congressionally-granted jurisdiction.
However, this consensus—if it ever existed—became less persuasive
over time. Despite today’s “global marketplace,” it is unclear
whether a consensus still exists with regard to antitrust law.
IV. THE BOEING INVESTIGATIONS: ANTITRUST
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AS POLITICAL DYNAMITE
In the context of antitrust extraterritoriality, the American
judiciary’s incremental movement toward rejecting comity contrasts
sharply with the abrupt speed of the European Commission’s
challenge to the merger of two American aerospace giants, Boeing
and McDonnell Douglas. The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger
investigations by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the
European Commission’s Directorate General IV (European
Commission) and the surrounding political brinkmanship show that
extraterritorial enforcement of competition policies can be a flash
point of international conflict. The very existence of the European
Commission’s investigation also suggests that an international
understanding to forego enforcement of the competition laws of a
nation or economic union against conduct beyond its borders no
longer exists, if it ever did.136
The European Commission’s investigation was focused on a
merger, rather than on past acts by companies that had participated in
overseas product markets. While the merger involved overlapping
jurisdictions, it did not involve a direct conflict of American and
European law.
As markets, economic actors, and regulators
increasingly traverse national borders, the opportunities for conflict
multiply. The force behind this conflict is identical to the pressure for

135. See Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111.
136. The United States and the European Union have recently signed a “positive comity
agreement.” See United States, European Union Sign Comity in Competition Pact, 1
COMPETITION LAW 579, (1998) (reporting the June 4, 1998 signing of the “[a]greement between
the European Communities and the Government of the United States on the application of
positive comity principles in the enforcement of their competition laws”). The new agreement
does not apply to merger enforcement and would, of course, not apply to private suits. See id..
Its future impact is unclear, as its primary effect is to “outline[] procedures under which one
government may request another government to use its own antitrust laws to address anticompetitive behavior affecting the requesting government.” Id.
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trade protectionism: strong domestic interests in most democratic
nations demand that politicians shelter domestic jobs and industries.137
The Boeing investigations illustrate the conflict stemming from
divergent American and European interests and standards of premerger analysis. In December 1996, the Seattle-based Boeing
Company announced its intention to acquire its biggest domestic
competitor, St. Louis-based McDonnell Douglas. Combined, the two
firms employed 190,000 workers,138 and had no aircraft production
facilities located in Europe.139 Before the merger, Boeing was the
United States’ largest exporter, selling sixty percent of its
merchandise abroad.140 After the merger, Boeing would become the
sole American manufacturer of commercial-jet aircraft, would possess
two-thirds of the worldwide market, and would be the United States’
second largest defense contractor.141
On July 1, 1997, the FTC announced that it had closed its
investigation of the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger. Four of the
five commissioners decided that “the acquisition would not
substantially lessen competition in . . . either defense or commercial
aircraft markets.”142 The FTC also found that “there are no current or
future procurements of fighter aircraft by the Department of Defense
in which the two firms would likely compete.”143 With respect to
commercial aircraft, the FTC cited “evidence that (1) McDonnell
Douglas, looking to the future, no longer [would] constitute[] a
meaningful competitive force . . . and (2) there [was] no economically
plausible strategy that McDonnell Douglas could follow, either as a
stand-alone concern or as part of another concern, that would change
137. Indeed, British legislators’ catering to domestic insurers at the expense of American
insurance consumers “permitted greater collusion among insurers than was permitted in the
United States,” possibly “because a more permissive attitude towards anti-competitive conduct
[would] allow domestic producers to increase their profits at the expense of foreign consumers
to an extent sufficient to offset the loss to domestic consumers from the same anti-competitive
conduct.” Dodge, supra note 10, at 156-57. This alleged bias towards the interests of domestic
producers exists in U.S. law as well. See The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 6(a), 45(a)(3) (1994) (exempting U.S. export commerce from the U.S. antitrust laws,
provided there are no “direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable” effects on domestic
commerce or other domestic exporters).
138. See Ken Silverstein, The Boeing Formation, HARPER’S MAG., May 1997, at 56-57.
139. See A ‘Dangerous’ Merger?, WALL ST. J., July 21, 1997, at A22.
140. See Silverstein supra note 138, at 57.
141. See id.
142. Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners Janet D. Steiger, Roscoe B.
Starek III and Christine A. Varney (last modified Aug. 28, 1998) <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/
9707/boeingsta.htm>
143. Id.
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that grim prospect.”144 After a “lengthy and detailed investigation
into the acquisition’s potential effects on competition,” the FTC
concluded that McDonnell Douglas was “no longer in a position to
influence significantly the competitive dynamics of the commercial
aircraft market,” due to its failure to invest sufficiently in “new
product lines, production facilities, company infrastructure, or
research and development.”145
The European Commission did not view the merger so benignly.
It notified Boeing of its objection to the merger in May 1997 and
announced a July deadline for its official statement on the merger.146
The European Commission’s investigation was driven by its Merger
Regulation, which applies to all companies that have a “community
dimension.”147 Under the Merger Regulation, a proposed merger is
reviewed using a three-step process that includes: (1) defining the
relevant product and geographic markets; (2) determining whether
the company in question has a “dominant position”; and (3)
considering whether the dominant position, if any, presents a
significant impediment to competition.148 For the Boeing/McDonnell
Douglas merger, the European Commission defined the relevant
product market as “large commercial jet aircraft,” the relevant
geographic market as worldwide,149 and concluded that Boeing’s premerger sixty-four percent worldwide market share for large
commercial jets and installed base of sixty percent of planes in service
amounted to a dominant position.150 The European Commission
expressed concerns that the acquisition of McDonnell Douglas would
increase Boeing’s customer base from sixty percent to eighty-four
percent of those planes then in worldwide service, and that Boeing
would have an increased ability to negotiate with customers for
exclusive supply arrangements, such as those it had obtained with
American Airlines and Delta Airlines, thus foreclosing competitors
from significant segments of the worldwide market for large
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Cool Heads Needed in Brussels and Washington, 9 FIN. TIMES BUS. L. EUR. 16,
May 29, 1997 (reporting that the Commission had informed Boeing and McDonnell Douglas of
its concerns).
147. See Commission Regulation 1310/97, 1997 O.J. (L 180) 1 (defining “community
dimension”).
148. See Commission Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1990 O.J. (L 257) 16.
149. See Commission Decision of 97/816, 1997 O.J. (L 336) 17-19.
150. See id. at 22, 24.
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commercial jets.151 Citing the additional concern that Boeing’s
acquisition of McDonnell Douglas’ defense division would enhance
its access to government-funded research and development, the
European Commission concluded that the merger would strengthen
Boeing’s existing dominant position.152
After several weeks of tense negotiations and political
brinkmanship,153 on July 30 the European Commission issued its final
approval of the merger, specifically noting concessions it had wrung
from Boeing.154 The European Commission had decided that because
Boeing’s concessions would remedy the problems it had uncovered,
the merger was not unlawful.155 The key concessions were that
Boeing would: (1) end existing and future exclusive supply deals with
several airlines; (2) “ring-fence”156 McDonnell Douglas’ commercial
division for ten years; and (3) license nonexclusive patents generated
through government-funded research to other jet aircraft
manufacturers.157 While Boeing avoided sanctions and further
litigation, it was forced to significantly change the future operation of
the merged firm and submit to the Commission’s ongoing monitoring
of its government-funded research.158
The European Commission succeeded in extracting significant
concessions from an American company with no European
operations, without a comity analysis or other explicit deference,
based solely on the European Commission’s predictions of a merger’s
possible future effects within its jurisdiction and its power to levy
sanctions.159 Although the European Commission cited concerns
including indirect subsidies to Boeing through U.S. defense contracts,
a four-percent rise in Boeing’s share of the worldwide commercial
aircraft market, and Boeing’s exclusive sales contracts, more than a
few American officials saw another concern at work during the
negotiations: Airbus Industrie, Boeing’s major competitor, which
historically has been subsidized by the governments of four of the
151. See id. at 24.
152. See id. at 30-36.
153. See A ‘Dangerous’ Merger?, supra note 139.
154. See Commission Decision of 97/816, supra note 149, at 36-38.
155. See id. at 39.
156. To “ring-fence” a division, component, or subsidiary is to operate the unit as a separate
business entity. See Boeing-McDonnell Merger Clears Hurdle, WALL ST. J., July 24, 1997, at A2.
157. See id. at 38-39.
158. See id. at 37-38.
159. For example, the Boeing faced a potential fine of up to 10% of its annual revenue. See
Council Regulation 4064/89, 1990 O.J. (L 257) 21.
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European Commission’s member states.160 European Commission
officials denied this contention.161
Although the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger may appear
unique due to the conflicting interests of Europe’s Airbus, it would be
a mistake to assume that such conflicts can only be produced by one
case. Producers in different nations often have conflicting economic
interests,162 and different competition authorities use strikingly
different criteria for decision making—another possible source of
friction. For U.S. authorities, consumer welfare is the lodestone of
merger review.163
Likewise, the European Commission views
consumer welfare as important, but it also considers non-competitive
concerns such as fostering economic integration among member
states.164 Depending upon the interpretation of its regulations, the
European Commission’s guiding laws may expressly authorize
antitrust actions aimed at protecting European competitors.165
Concerns such as regional integration or protecting domestic industry

160. See, e.g., Alex Fryer, Europeans, Boeing May Have a Deal, SEATTLE TIMES, July 22,
1997, at A1 (reporting that U.S. Representative Jack Metcalf (R-Wash.) planned to introduce a
House resolution condemning the Commission investigation as an “unwarranted and
unprecedented interference in a United States business transaction”); Clinton Hints U.S. May
Retaliate if EU Tries to Block Boeing-McDonnell Deal, WALL ST. J., July 18, 1997, at A2.
161. See Official Press Release of European Union, IP/97/400 (May 13, 1997) (available at
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/pressre.htm>) (quoting Karel Van Miert, European
Commissioner in charge of Competition Policy, as stating that “our analysis of this case is
strictly conducted along the lines and criteria which have been spelled out in the legal
framework of the merger Regulation, and nothing else”).
162. See Dodge, supra note 10 (noting that nations have a systematic bias towards underenforcement of antitrust regulation versus their domestic producers).
163. See, e.g., Minutes of the Roundtable Conference with Enforcement Officials, ABA
Section of Antitrust Law, 45th Annual Spring Meeting (Apr. 11, 1997) (quoting FTC Chairman
Robert Pitofsky as stating that the new merger guidelines do not view general welfare as a
recognizable efficiency, and that “[a]ntitrust is about producing competitive markets that give
consumers better products at lower prices”).
164. See, e.g., Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1990 O.J. (L 257), Recitals 2-4, 13 (reciting that the
promulgation of the Merger Regulation was consistent with the goals of increasing Europe’s
industrial competitiveness and furthering European integration, as well as consumer welfare).
165. See Amy Ann Karpel, Comment, The European Commission’s Decision on the BoeingMcDonnell Douglas Merger and the Need for Greater U.S.-EU Cooperation in the Merger Field,
47 AM. U. L. REV. 1029, 1057 n.168. “An attempt to foster European industry would not have
been a contravention of EC law, for the goal of EC Competition Policy is not only to promote
competition, but also to promote the strength of European industry.” Id. (citing Regulation
4064/89, recitals 4, 13, at 14-15, which state that mergers should be reviewed in part on their
effect on the competitiveness of European industry and European integration).
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are not generally considerations of the U.S. antitrust enforcement
agencies.166
The differences in approach are not confined to the United
States and the European Union. For example, Japan’s Fair Trade
Commission has historically made exceptions for “rationalization
cartels” (also known as “depression cartels”) in industries
characterized by overcapacity.167 China, an increasingly important
market, has also fostered the creation of price fixing cartels in ailing
industries.168 By contrast, the U.S. Department of Justice views all
intentional cartel formation or price-fixing behavior as a criminal
offense, even where the defendant is a foreign entity.169
The European Commission’s Boeing investigation demonstrates
that, at least with respect to Europe, any American approach to
comity regarding antitrust extraterritoriality cannot proceed on an
assumed consensus among nations. Furthermore, a direct conflict
between American and foreign law, while perhaps not present in the
Boeing investigations, is increasingly likely to occur now that the
Boeing investigation has paved the way for greater extraterritorial
enforcement of antitrust law in the future. To the extent that the
United States further engages in enforcement that conflicts with the
authority and law of other nations, U.S. courts will often have to
address what weight to give those nations’ laws.
V. THE ERIE PROBLEM, OR WHENCE COMITY?
The Hartford Fire Court presumed that, were a comity analysis
necessary, it would be guided by the principles of the Restatement

166. See Minutes of the Roundtable Conference, supra note 163.
167. See W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 590 (1996) (listing
exceptions to Japan’s Antimonopoly Law, including “depression and rationalization cartels”);
M. Matsushita, The Antimonopoly Law of Japan, 11 LAW IN JAPAN 57, 66 (1978) (noting that
the exception for a depression cartel agreement is possible “when the price of [manufacturers’]
product drops below the average production cost and it would be hard to overcome this
difficulty through rationalization”).
168. See China Fosters Price-Fixing Cartels as Economy Crimps Firms’ Profits, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 3, 1998, at A17 (noting that “[g]overnment officials say the steps are necessary” but that
“Chinese economists . . . say China needs antitrust legislation”).
169. See, e.g., United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 2 (“[T]he United States
attempt[ed] to convict a foreign corporation under the Sherman Act . . . alleging that pricefixing activities which took place entirely in Japan are prosecutable because they were intended
to have, and did in fact have, substantial effects in [the United States].”).
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(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. The First
Circuit in Nippon Paper Industries171 and the Ninth Circuit in Metro
172
Industries followed similar reasoning. Many courts have also
presumed that federal common law incorporates customary
international law (CIL).173 In fact, the concurrence in Nippon Paper
Industries espoused a similar view, finding it necessary to adopt an
“interpretation of the Sherman Act [that] does not conflict with other
legal principles, including principles of international law”174 and then
applying the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, which “restates international law, as derived from
customary international law and from international agreements.”175
There is disagreement, however, on whether CIL forms part of
the body of federal common law.176 In general, the critiques on
Sherman Act extraterritoriality stem from the positivist inquiry
regarding CIL. This line of inquiry asks “what is the source of [CIL]
norms, . . . how can they apply as law within the United States, . . .
[and] who are judges to be making this law?”177 Professors Curtis

170. 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
UNITED STATES §§ 403 cmt. e, 415 cmt. j(1987)). See also id. at 813-21 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
171. 109 F.3d at 8.
172. 82 F.3d 839, 846 n.5 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hartford Fire’s view of comment e of
section 403, and comment j of section 415 of the Restatement).
173. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting the “settled
proposition that federal common law incorporates international law”), cert. denied, 518 U.S.
1005 (1996); In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th
Cir. 1992) (stating that “the law of nations is part of federal common law”), cert. denied, 508
U.S. 972 (1993); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 193 (D. Mass. 1995) (deeming it “well
settled that the body of principles that comprise customary international law is subsumed and
incorporated by federal common law”).
174. 109 F.3d at 10 (Lynch, J., concurring).
175. Id. at 11.
176. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 876 (1997) (stating
that “both the academy and the courts have taken for granted fundamental propositions about
the domestic legal status of CIL”); Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and
International Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1266 (concluding that “[b]ecause asking the courts
to apply customary international law to control the executive in foreign relations matters is, as
Erie makes clear, asking them to claim authority over foreign relations matters, if the courts do
not have that authority they must decline the invitation to act as though they had the
authority”).
177. Lawrence Lessig, Erie Effects, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1796 (1997) (characterizing the
dilemma posed by Professors Bradley and Goldsmith regarding the validity of CIL as federal
common law). See, e.g., Weisburd, supra note 176 at 1267 (maintaining that “to the extent the
federal courts may apply customary international law, this law is subject to all the limitations to
which other branches of federal common law are subject”).

THE
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Bradley and Jack Goldsmith remark that “for several decades after
Erie, it remained an open (and generally unaddressed) question
whether CIL was part of th[e] new federal common law.”178 They
contend that “the recent ascendancy of CIL to the status of federal
common law is the result of a combination of troubling developments,
including mistaken interpretations of history, doctrinal bootstrapping
by the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, and academic
fiat.”179
The implication of this argument is that courts cannot restrict the
Sherman Act’s reach without indicating the source of the restriction.
The sole Congressional enactment on the Sherman Act’s foreign
scope, the Foreign Trade and Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA),
provides that the Sherman Act is inapplicable to “conduct involving
trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce)
with foreign nations unless . . . such conduct has a direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable effect on trade or commerce which is not
trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade or import
commerce with foreign nations.”180 By its terms, the FTAIA covers
only export trade and provides no guidance with respect to nonexport trade, such as trade in imports or domestic trade.181 But it
essentially codifies the Alcoa test as the inquiry to apply to antitrust
claims regarding American export commerce. Notably, the FTAIA
contains no comity analysis.182 The FTAIA’s existence as the sole

178. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 176, at 821.
179. Id.
180. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290 § 402, 96 Stat.
1233, 1246 (codified at various sections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 45(a) (1994)).
181. See id.
182. The idea that Congress has not given the courts power to halt antitrust enforcement
based on comity and that this power does not come from elsewhere—including CIL—may be
gaining ground. See, e.g., United States v. Time Warner, Inc., No. MISC.A. 94-338(HHG), 1997
WL 118413, at *6 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 1997) (dismissing an attempt, based in part on the FTAIA
and in part on comity concerns, to thwart extraterritorial discovery by the Justice Department in
a price-fixing investigation, and stating that “[t]he Executive Branch . . . is charged with
determining whether the importance of antitrust enforcement outweighs any relevant foreign
policy concerns”). It should be noted, however, that the FTAIA’s legislative history contains an
explicit statement by Congress expressing no view whether a court with subject-matter
jurisdiction should ever decline to exercise such jurisdiction on grounds of international comity.
See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 13 (1982) (“If a court determines that the requirements for subject
matter jurisdiction are met, [the FTAIA] would have no effect on the court[‘s] ability to employ
notions of comity . . . or otherwise to take account of the international character of the
transaction.”). The Supreme Court took explicit note of this Congressional statement in
Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993).
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statutory authorization on the subject suggests that a comity analysis
is inappropriate.
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith note that while “[t]he courts
have already endorsed the modern position that CIL has the status of
federal common law, . . . they have not yet embraced some of the
implications of this claim.”183 Although Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith did not mention the Sherman Act specifically, the
Hartford Fire court treated the Restatement (and therefore, CIL) as
legal authority while assuming, without concluding, that the end
result of its application was required.184 The positivist critique points
to the difficulty inherent in restricting statutory law on the grounds of
relatively undefined principles.
Customary international law poses two types of constitutional
dilemmas in the Sherman Act context. First, CIL would dip a judicial
hand into foreign relations and the complex, agency-governed
application of federal antitrust laws. Fundamentally, this poses a
problem of institutional competence—one that the Constitution may
already have resolved.185 But the application of CIL to Sherman Act
extraterritoriality also creates a second, counter-majoritarian
dilemma. Specifically, it would allow CIL to restrict the reach
implied by the Sherman Act and the FTAIA, statutes enacted by
elected representatives. Additionally, CIL’s jurisdictional limits,
whether they reside in the “old CIL,” reflecting a set of traditional
understandings among nations that governed their relations, or the
new normative, human rights-oriented CIL, have not been subjected
to a vote. In the Cold War’s aftermath, competition among nations
has shifted from military power to economic power.186 The American
judiciary should hesitate to restrict laws that enhance the nation’s
ability to enforce its consumers’ interests in this new arena of
international competition, especially when courts cannot point to a
positive source for the basis on which they are doing so.

183. Bradley and Goldsmith, supra note 176, at 874.
184. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 799 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW §§ 415 cmt. j, 403 cmt. e (1987)); see also id. at 813-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
185. See, e.g., Chung, supra note 10, at 397 n. 218 (citing Laker Airways Ltd. v. Saberra, 731
F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) as supporting the theory that “the courts are not the proper forum to
balance the myriad global concerns implicated in international antitrust disputes”); cf. Dam,
supra note 10, at 317-23 (expressing concern that without comity, the judicial branch would
affect foreign relations by allowing private antitrust actions to proceed).
186. See Kevin Phillips, Troops Must Come Home to Win the Economic War, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 4, 1990, at 3 (prominent Republican advisor discussing the challenge of shifting from a
global military competition to an economic one).
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In sum, CIL, as a source of restraint on the Sherman Act,
appears questionable because of CIL’s inherent lack of authority in
the Erie sense and the renewed focus on economics as a field of
competition among nations. To the extent that CIL has been
described as a set of understandings “result[ing] from a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation,”187 CIL seems all the less legitimate given the increasing
interdependence of national economies and the shift in focus among
states from military to economic competition. Additionally, given
both Hartford Fire and the Boeing incident, there appears to be an
erosion of any consensus on CIL’s stance on the non-extraterritorial
application of antitrust law among sovereign states. After all, it is
unlikely that the U.S. Supreme Court was unaware of the possibility
that American antitrust law could significantly impact foreign
interests, even in the absence of a direct conflict of American and
foreign laws. Similarly, the European Commission’s willingness to
interfere with the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger demonstrates
that foreign antitrust enforcers have also decided that any consensus
behind comity has eroded.
VI. CONCLUSION
If the interests of the United States and other nations were
nearly identical, and if there were an international consensus as to its
regulation and extraterritorial scope, the interests of both the United
States and other nations could be served by a doctrine that
encourages courts to restrain the exercise of antitrust jurisdiction in
response to comity concerns. But the dispute between Boeing and
the European Commission suggests that there is no such international
consensus. Additionally, to the extent that national interests diverge
and antitrust policy can and will be used to further those interests, it is
not clear when, if ever, there will be a true international consensus.
As the Second Circuit acknowledged when it addressed arguments
that comity should compel courts to withhold jurisdiction in financial
market regulation actions, nations with interests that differ from
those of the United States can become havens for those who seek to
simultaneously exploit American markets and avoid U.S. regulations.
Judge Selya’s awareness of this danger in Nippon Paper Industries
suggests that the lower courts may begin to be swayed by concerns

187. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
102(2) (1987).
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that counsel in favor of exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction,
particularly given the fact that Hartford Fire has confined comity to a
limited role.
Increased extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws may
not be an adequate response to the need for cooperation in
international relations. However, there are several countervailing
points favoring extraterritoriality. First, international cooperation
can still take place, but it will be against a backdrop of U.S. courts
that are prepared to apply U.S. law extraterritorially after a simple
“whipsaw” comity inquiry. Second, the extraterritorial application of
American antitrust standards could actually spur international
negotiations, although such negotiations will not be instantaneous. If
courts continue to limit or abandon comity concerns in deciding
whether to apply U.S. antitrust law extraterritorially, they will supply
an additional benefit: it should be easier for businesspeople and
regulators to predict whether conduct is governed by U.S. law.
Finally, to the extent that comity concerns are incompatible with
other features of U.S. law (such as extraterritorial financial market
regulation and the need for an ascertainable source of law after Erie),
a judicial approach that limits or abandons comity analysis better
comports with established principles.

